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From the Declaration of Barcelona in 1995 to European Neighbourhood 
Policy in 2005  
 
The ten years that have passed from the start of the Process of Barcelona 
constitute an occasion for analysis, reflection and appraisal of the events that 
have filled this period and of the achieved or unfulfilled objectives. Occasions 
for encounter have not been lacking in the course of 2005.  
The 35 foreign affairs ministers of the European Union (EU) and the 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPs) decided in the course of the meeting at 
The Hague, 29-30 November 2004, to convene an extraordinary conference 
(Barcellona+10) at government level to be held in Barcelona in November 2005, 
in order to celebrate the decennial of the declaration and to ”reinvigorate Euro-
Mediterranean relations”.  
The European Commission declared 2006 to be the ”year of the 
Mediterranean”. In tandem, other initiatives convoked by civil society and other 
important institutional players have been carried out, such as the Conference of 
Mediterranean Universities at Tarragona in June 2005, and the Mediterranean 
Social Forum in Barcelona in June 2005.  
The second Barcelona Conference was held as planned in November 2005 
and has been a failure. The Arab states were represented by low-level 
representatives and it ended with a split among European and Arab states. The 
reasons for this failure are various. The EU was represented by Tony Blair, in 
charge of the EU Presidency, certainly not the most appropriate person to chair 
such a meeting. At the first Barcelona Conference, the EU was represented the 
Vice-president Solana and therefore his good practice could have been applied 
again. Moreover, the unilateral decision to start the European Neighbourhood 
Policy could not be interpreted other than a disengagement of the EU towards 
the Mediterranean countries and the common project of Barcelona. It would be 
better therefore for the countries of the south to get down from a useless table of 
negotiations in order to play their own cards in bilateral relationships. Finally, 
the agenda of the Conference, prepared by Tony Blair, had many topics to deal 
with, namely terrorism, terrorism and terrorism... in whose name it envisaged 
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measures that clearly open the road to even stronger intrusions than those put 
into effect towards the Arab countries to date. This is a position that surely sees 
both the governments as well as the opposition of these countries to be 
consenting in their negative response. In a word, a conference prepared with an 
evident spirit of arrogance and incompetence on the political relationships of the 
area, which abandoned that spirit of cooperation that had, in spite of everything, 
prevailed in 1995. The advantage for Europe of the absence of high level 
delegations from the Arab countries is that this has avoided the risk of even 
more dramatic and significant and breaches. The new European Neighbourhood 
Policy launched by the EU, which has raised comprehensible worries between 
MPs and the observatories, takes its origin in the Treaty Plan for the European 
constitution presented to the President of the European Council in July 2003. 
These events are interwoven with other important institutional 
engagements, such as the ratification of the European Constitution, currently in 
progress, whose outcome may also produce effects on Euro-Mediterranean 
relationships. In fact, the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched 
by the EU, which has raised comprehensible worries between the MPs and 
observers, draws its origin from the Treaty Project establishing a European 
constitution presented to the president of the European Council in July 2003.  
The new policy comprises all the countries, near and far, that the EU 
intends addressing in order to establish relationships in the framework of 
strengthening political and economic cooperation, security and culture. The 
countries expressly mentioned are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and all the MPs.  
The ENP is set in a general framework of international relationships of the 
EU, that has been strongly modified by its recent decisions of enlargement and 
growing alignment toward the Atlantic positions of foreign policy.  
15 countries of the EU and 12 MPs met at Barcelona. Today, respectively 
25 and 9 countries are to be found facing each other. Some of the countries that 
were found among the MPs at Barcelona (for tactical choice of the EU) are now 
in the group of the ”candidate” countries (3), of the potential candidates (8) and 
of ”near” countries (16, of which 9 MPs).  
The “near” countries do not have well defined common characteristics, as 
is the case for the MPs, from a historical, political, cultural and geographical 
point of view. The methodologies are also diverse, based on bilateral 
relationships, at times treated in terms of competition between the countries.  
The Mediterranean, from being identified in the Declaration of Barcelona 
of 1995 as the strategic axis of a European construction that saw the fulcrum of 
its own history and multiversi inspiration in this region, as well as the place of 
experimentation and demonstration of European diversity with respect to a 
model of western colonization, is today drawn back inside the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, namely diluted in that disordered archipelago of 
countries placed around the “centre”, both European and western, towards which 
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policies of neighbourliness are to be put into effect for the ends of 
“stabilization” and political “control”. 
The consequences of this change are surely multiple and have not gone 
unnoticed. It is surprising that an Agreement (of Barcelona) solemnly signed by 
the heads of state of the countries of the UE and the southern shores, based on 
the principle of partnership and sharing, has been cancelled with a unilateral 
initiative, neither discussed nor agreed upon by the other countries participating 
at the Agreement. Surely not a positive example of good practice in terms of 
democracy and participation.  
This decision was accompanied by the affirmation that in the future the UE 
will be able to make agreements of collaboration with the near countries that 
decide to introduce “values” or ”policies” of the UE (“acquis communitaire”), 
but without any possibility (hope) of being able to arrive thereafter at sharing the 
institutions governing the EU (“everything but institutions”, according to 
Romano Prodi’s formulation).  
A wall has therefore been set up between the member countries and the 
near countries, which cuts through all the relationships of collaboration and 
integration already started in the major European regions between the member 
countries and the others. This is the case of the Baltic Countries with their 
imitative of integration with the Nordic Countries and Russia, and of the south 
European countries with their multiple ties towards other Mediterranean 
countries.  
 It is surely no surprise that an attentive author on the Mediterranean such 
as Pietro Barcellona, who had written on the “Mediterranean as a sacred place” 
states that: “There is no Europe without the Mediterranean and there is no 
Mediterranean without Europe”1, has today updated his analysis with the recent: 
“Suicide of Europe”. 2 
This “unilateral” shift of the EU radically modifies the guidelines that had 
inspired the strategies around two central benchmarks for decades: the policies 
of social cohesion inside and policies of economic cooperation towards the 
contiguous regions (Wider Europe).  
A structured approach, of meso-regional and multilateral type geo-
economic and geopolitical relationships, as alternatives to the destabilizing 
effects of globalization, is now shifted towards a fragmentation of interventions 
and policies towards the single states, whose only points of reference are the 
economic interests and security of a unilaterally defined and administered EU.  
In such a way, the EU abandons its own way of being that has constituted 
the basis for the creation of the European Social Model, and makes globalization 
and competitiveness (rivalry) its main priorities and choices. Within this new 
framework, European thought and policies become subsidiary with respect to the 
choices of the capitalistic Triad (globalization) and its global policeman (the 
United States).  
                                           
1 Barcellona Pietro, Le passioni negate, Città Aperta, Troina, 2001  
2 Barcellona, Il suicidio dell’Europa, Dedalo Bari, 2005  
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The strong signals of this <Atlantic> drift of Europe - of an opposite trend 
to those that had determined its birth, namely the objectives of economies of 
peace, respect for the sovereignty and independence of nation states, and of 
sustainability to be achieved by transforming the rivalry and competition 
between European states into cooperation and synergies - were all present, and 
in turn pointed out, in the Lisbon Agenda of 2000.  
In that document the long-term objectives of the growth of the EU were 
established and the directions for the European policies of growth and 
competition affirmed, constituting the guidelines of what was to become the 
“strategic dimension of the European space” on Eurocentric positions and 
cultural colonialism.3  
The adhesion of European trade unions to the Lisbon Agenda was justified 
by the parts of the document recalling social objectives and employment. What 
was not wished to be seen, however, was that this happened in a context of 
competitiveness at a global level not subjected to but rather demanded, and in an 
approach of foreign policy and international cooperation that by now was 
pushing towards a perspective of “Global Apartheid” within which the objective 
of rights and social equity cannot fail to be anything than distorted. 4  
The passage from Lisbon Agenda, that aligns the economic policies of the 
Union to those of capitalist globalization (to the detriment of internal social 
cohesion), to the “European Neighbourhood Policy”, that inserts the EU into 
Atlantic strategies of expansion and global control (to the detriment of European 
co-development policies), was managed by the Presidency of the Commission 
by means of a series of transitions whose main steps were the EU Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), the Stability and Growth Pact (1996), Single Currency (2002), up 
until the Treaty for the European Constitution (2004).  
This kind of triumphant march towards an ever closer union is producing 
the opposite effects to those desired, namely a situation of growing popular 
opposition and institutional collapse of the Union. The supplement of The 
Economist on Outgrowing the Union of 25 September 2004 concludes with the 
forecast of a “Europe à la carte”, owing to the increasing malaise of Europeans 
with respect to a model of Eurocentric and western integration.  
 
 
European Union and the Mediterranean 
 
The “collapse of the wall” in 1989, that together with the end of the Cold War 
could have provided the chance to resume the process of European unification 
based on polycentrism, was very soon transformed into a shift towards the east 
and to the south, with the destabilization of those areas with respect to new 
heralded conflicts against the Far East.  
                                           
3 "The International Dimension of the European Research Area", COM (2001) 346 final, 25.6.2001,  
Brussels, 25.6.2001.   
4 Amoroso Bruno, Apartheid Globale, ed. Lavoro, Roma 1999  
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The result was the drive of the interests of strong European countries 
(Germany and England together with the Scandinavian countries) to insert the 
countries of central and northern Europe in the Union inside a protective belt of 
its eastern borders subject to their control, easily conquered thanks to the greater 
docility shown by these countries in accepting and putting into effect the 
conditions foreseen for integration into the EU.  
These events have reopened the practice of negotiations and bilateral 
agreements, with the abandonment of the meso-regional approach of the 90s and 
the geopolitical strategy of the Wider Europe that had introduced a method of 
multilateral relationships.  
Of the two spirits that are always present in Euro-Mediterranean 
relationships, namely of those who mainly see these in a context of emergency 
due to the risks that the area represents for European countries owing to the 
three bombs needing to be defused (the Muslim, demographic and atomic 
bombs), and those who instead underline the opportunities for Europe to 
regenerate itself culturally and economically by means of fecundation with its 
own neighbours, it is certainly the former vision that has prevailed.  
This change is the arrival point of a wearing down of the cultures and 
efforts of more than a decade that began with the Gulf War and, subsequently, 
European aggression against Yugoslavia. A war, this latter, justified with the 
need to intervene in the “Yugoslavian tragedy” that precisely the European 
states had nurtured because of the diversities of the “vital interests” perceived 
and pursued by every state. 
Notwithstanding the attempts made to find a balanced relationship between 
these two approaches5, the countries of the south have increasingly been seen as 
the source of risks from which it is necessary to defend oneself and the concept 
of “security” and “military threat”, typical of NATO language, has become 
enriched with that of “economic and social risks” reflected in the “new model of 
Italian defence” since 1991.  
The lengthy work carried out on interdependencies and cooperation for a 
serious critical reconsideration of European productive systems, was therefore 
interrupted and guided towards an argument on the vulnerability of European 
countries and the requirement to defend their “vital interests” also when 
threatened beyond the frontiers.  
This blinds every effort for innovation with the bending towards the 
defence of “acquired rights” by Europe in protecting economic, political and 
institutional relationships, which instead had and still have the need to be raised 
again in debate and deeply transformed. 6 
An incisive and careful observer of European Union Mediterranean 
policies, Andrea Amato highlights, commenting on those events, that:  
 
                                           
5
  See the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
6 Bernard Ravenel, Méditerranée, l’impossible mur, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995.  
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“Common security” is increasingly seen as a utopia of the past. Europe is today inclined 
to identify its security with its prosperity — a prosperity increasingly threatened by its 
neighbours. If, on one hand, this means closing the doors of “Fortress” Europe, a policy of 
security defined by the member states of the Union in national terms, on the other hand it 
means maintaining the economic advantages based on the disparity in the relationships with 
the southern countries—a status quo to be conserved at all costs, even by supplying military 
assistance to the elites in power in these countries. 7 
 
The road embarked upon marks a resumption of the north-south 
relationships in the Mediterranean along the route of the traditional north-south 
economic relationships (arms against oil), and excludes every form of economic 
and institutional evolution in the southern countries (south-south relationships 
and institutional modifications decided by the populations of these countries) 
that may threaten the consolidated relationships of Europe in those areas. 8  
However, the 90s also saw the blooming of studies and analyses that throw 
light on the unsustainability of these developments due to the exponential 
growth of social imbalances between the two sides of the Mediterranean. The 
CNEL reports on the Mediterranean published during 1991-2001, critically 
document and analyze the data of that decade and have also found confirmation 
in the analyses of international agencies. 9  
The Mediterranean was heading towards a social and political drift that 
heralded the conflict of civilization between the two shores, between the Arab 
world in its various national articulations and Europe. 10 
The Conference and the Declaration of Barcelona in 1995 represented the 
result of an elaboration in parallel to these events but for many aspects it 
contrasted them.11 However, their weight heavily influenced the outcome by 
restricting participation to the Mediterranean countries of the south “side”, in 
order to counterbalance the natural power of the Arab countries with the 
presence of Malta, Cyprus, Israel and Turkey, and excluding the Balkans.  
The final Declaration affirmed the commitment to the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership on three points of the program:  
                                           
7 Amato Andrea,          
8 Andrea Amato, “Le politiche della CE per i paesi del Mediterraneo: dall’eurocentrismo alla cooperazione 
regionale”, in Da mosaico a regione, Rubettino, Catanzaro, 1993.  
9 I. Divan and L. Squine, “Economic and Social Development in the Middle East and North Africa”, Discussion 
Paper Series no. 3, World Bank, October 1992. TAD-EC Commission, General Directorate XXVI, “Impact sur le 
dévelopment regional et l’aménnagement de l’espace communautaire des pays du Sud et de l’Est Méditerranéen 
(PSEM)”, Paris, 1992.  
10 Amoroso,  Europa e Mediterraneo, Dedalo Bari.  
11 The Euro-Mediterranean intergovernative conference held on 27-28 November 1995.  The participants at the 
Barcelona Conference comprised the UE, represented by Vice president Manuel Marin, the Council, represented 
by the President at the time Javier Solana, the ministers of the countries of the 15 EU member states and the 12 
third Mediterranean countries (TMC) —Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority (represented by Yasser Arafat). The countries of the south included 
11 of the 12 TMC countries with which the EC had already undertaken aid and cooperation agreements from the 
60s and 70s.  The country absent from the conference was Yugoslavia and the new participant was the Palestinian 
Authority.  Note that diction “states”, used to designate European countries, and "partner", for the countries of the 
southern shores, have only been created in order to gain Israel’s refusal to accept the diction "state" for the 
Palestinian state. Another missed opportunity for the Barcelona Conference.  
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1. Policy and security partnership for the creation of a common area of peace 
and stability, to be pursued through political dialogue and the sharing of 
principles and objectives of international law.  
2. Economic and financial partnership for an area of common prosperity, to be 
put into effect by: a) the gradual realization of an area of free exchange 
between the countries of the EU and the 12 countries of the southern 
shores; b) the realization of programs of cooperation and aid in agreed 
areas and fields; c) increased financial aid of the EU to the Mediterranean 
partner countries.  
3. Social, cultural and human partnership, in order to favour the development 
of human resources and understanding and the exchange between cultures.  
 
The results achieved by the Conference of Barcelona with this Declaration, 
that constitutes the first multilateral agreement signed between the EU and the 
countries of the south shores, testify to the effort to strengthen the EU 
Mediterranean policies of co-development and to resist the climate up to then 
pursued by the policies of European governments and the European Union. A 
shift that has been interpreted by some as the result of a rhetorical forcing that 
would have prevailed on the circumspect weave of policies of control and 
containment of the area. 12 
 
 
The historical roots of the Barcelona process  
 
The Barcelona process was characterized with respect to other policies and 
agreements, by its all-inclusive nature – economic and cultural – and should 
therefore be evaluated in all its aspects. The outcomes and appraisals are 
numerous and concordant and it is possible therefore to offer a synthesis here by 
recalling the three points of the program.  
 
1. Policy and Security Partnership for the creation of a common area of 
peace and stability.  
 
To attribute the increasing social and political conflicts and military aggressions 
against the Arab countries to the failure of Barcelona would be ungenerous. In 
truth, though, it is much worse. These wars and confrontations would not have 
been possible without Europe’s acceptance of the integration into capitalistic 
globalization and its positioning in tow to the policies of war by the United 
                                           
12 There is no lack of criticism and reservations on the Conference and its results. See: Amoroso B. E Gallina A., 
The impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone on the EU social cohesion and economic co-operation 
with the Wider Europe, Federico Caffè Center, Research Report 4/2001.  It may be dowloaded at: 
www.ruc.dk/federico.   
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States. The contrary indications of Barcelona therefore went disregarded and it 
could not have been otherwise.  
It is not difficult to realise that the wars in the Mediterranean are not 
Mediterranean wars, but the passage of a steam roller serving to open 
motorways for the passage of armoured vehicles towards the Far East and in 
particular China. This obviously upsets the geopolitical maps of the region along 
a warpath that winds around the Balkans, Turkey, the Middle East, the Persian 
Gulf and the Caucasus.  
Moreover, the rift between the EU member states over participation in the 
war has violently unearthed the conflict between the two West: the West and the 
Atlantic European, following a dividing line that cuts Europe in two. For the 
former, the Mediterranean is a priority that, in spite of the ambiguities expressed 
by post-colonial type bonds and interior migrations, expresses the will to 
proceed along lines of cultural economic and political dialogue. For the latter, 
the Mediterranean is a residual phenomenon of an imperialist and imperial 
conception of global development that does not recognize any particular 
prerogative of sovereignty and independent development to this region and sub-
areas. 13 
 
 
2. Economic and financial partnership for an area of common prosperity, to 
be put into effect by: a) the gradual realization of an area of free exchange 
between the countries of the EU and the 12 Countries of the southern shores; b) 
the realization of programs of cooperation and aid in agreed areas and fields; c) 
increased financial aid of the EU to the Mediterranean partner countries.  
 
The Mediterranean countries of the south, after a period of economic 
“cures”, ordered and monitored by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, arrived at the Barcelona appointment. That is with their accounts in order, 
as the economists would say with satisfaction, even if mounting internal social 
conflict had rendered the results achieved “fragile”. Moreover, albeit not 
undervaluing the differences from country to country, it has been recognized 
that the majority of the Mediterranean countries of the south are equipped with 
the necessary fiscal and monetary instruments to connect to national economies 
and the global economy.  
The successes and failures of the Barcelona process should therefore be 
read and evaluated by taking account the developments of globalization, the 
repercussions that this has produced on the composition of the very same 
European Union and on the new confrontations that it has generated within the 
single countries, of which it is necessary to take stock for a correct appraisal of 
                                           
13 Amoroso, Gallina, Gomez y Paloma, “Mediterraneo, economie, società e identità”, INCHIESTA, n. 141, July-
September 2003, Dedalo, Bari. Amoroso, Gallina, Gomez y Paloma, “Mediterraneo, aree critiche del 
cambiamento:scambi, agricoltura, cqua, migrazioni”, INCHIESTA, n. 142, October-December 2003, Dedalo, 
Bari.  
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the facts. Over the entire scenario, looms the global clash that since 2001 has 
been opened at an international level between the countries of the Triad, led by 
the United States, and the rest of the world.  
 
 
1950-1971 1972-1991 1992-1995 1995-2003 2003- 
 
Mediterranean 
Policy 
 
Global 
Mediterranean 
Policy 
 
 
Renewed 
Mediterranean 
Policy (RMP) 
 
 
The Euro-
Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) 
 
 
The new European 
Neighbourhood 
Policy 
Special bilateral 
agreements of 
association and 
trade agreements 
of preferential 
statute having the 
objective of 
maintaining 
privileged 
relationships of 
aid and 
commercial 
exchange with 
former European 
colonies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Third 
Mediterranean 
countries were 
beneficiaries of 
policies set up 
towards the 
countries of the 
Third World. 
These were 
offered access to 
European 
markets for 
exports, forms of 
economic aid 
and 
development. 
The model was 
the same as that 
applied with the 
Lomé 
Convention for 
the African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific countries 
(ACP).  
 
 
The 
Mediterranean as 
a risk area and 
security problem 
on the southern 
borders of the 
EC. The concept 
of 
neighbourhood 
was introduced 
with a negative 
significance. The 
130% increase in 
the funds 
foreseen for the 
MC (1992-1996) 
were reduced by 
the Council of 
Europe by 35% 
to be assigned in 
favour of the 
countries of 
central and 
eastern Europe.  
 
The Mediterranean 
is recognized as 
the strategic area 
for Europe. The 
neighbourhood 
concept was 
transformed from 
risk areas to one of 
opportunity. The 
meso-regional 
dimension is seen 
as the answer to 
the challenge of 
globalization. The 
Barcelona 
Conference 
introduces the 
concept of 
multilateralism in 
the north-south 
relationships of the 
Mediterranean.  
 
 
The Mediterranean 
disappears as the 
priority area of the 
European policies 
towards the outside 
and becomes part of 
the ensemble of 
countries that the 
EU indicates as 
strategic for its own 
ends of security and 
stability. A 
unilateral decision 
of the EU that re-
introduces the 
bilateral and 
competitive criterion 
in the relationships 
between single 
countries and the 
EU.  
POST-
COLONIALISM 
COOPERATIO
N 
CO-
DEVELOPMEN
T 
PARTNERSHIP 
“Rings of 
solidarity” 
NIGHBOUR-HOOD 
“Rings of friends” 
 
A clash of civilization, between those who deny the right to life in its 
cultural variants, considering it the privilege of rich geographic areas and 
income levels (“acquired rights”), and the billions of people that are the object 
of this denial.  
The Mediterranean is currently at the heart of this clash and our salvation 
(namely that of the billions) may depend on its ability to resist, that is to the 
extent that it will be able to delay or prevent the march of the western armies 
towards China.  
The Mediterranean policies have been the field of elaboration and 
experimentation of the EU policies towards “third countries” since the fifties. A 
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short synthesis of this path may help us to arrive in an appropriate way to the 
current situation and to the conflicts and alternatives that this expresses. This is a 
conceptual and political path that has come about by winding along a variable 
geometry regarding the involved countries, to both the north as well as the 
south.  
At its basis are various objective interpretations on what exactly the 
Mediterranean and its borders is, but also on the paths of institutional 
broadening of the EU, the phobias within this or that member country towards 
single countries, and finally the political conditioning imposed on the Union and 
the Mediterranean as a whole by external political and military intrusions, by the 
United States in particular.  
 
For a detailed analysis of the European Union’s Mediterranean policies, I 
refer to available studies on the argument.14 In the following, it is useful to 
concentrate on the last phase of these policies, namely preceding and then 
accompanying the realization of the agreements of Barcelona contained in the 
Document.  
An important aspect emerging from this pathway is the strong interweaving 
between European and Mediterranean policies, which confirms the indissoluble 
bond that exists in the present and future of these two global regions. In the final 
point, I will instead focus on the relationships between Europe and the 
Mediterranean, which are relationships between individuals and populations, 
whose history is in part reflected in the economic relationships and policies 
mentioned here but without coinciding with them, since they disentangle on 
largely different routes.  
The future scenarios of the new Europe were set out by many parties on the 
day after the “collapse of the wall”. The European Community, having 
overcome the division between East and West that had left it flattened out on a 
solely western and Atlantic dimension, could finally find its continental position 
again by unfolding itself to the North (Baltic), the East (central and eastern 
Europe) and to the South (the Mediterranean).  
From the territorial point of view, one of the reports elaborated in those 
years on behalf of FAST Program of the European Community, directed by 
Riccardo Petrella, highlighted the importance of a co-development bond 
between the great European regions. An idea of Great Europe was then worked 
out, institutionally organized on a network of autonomous meso-regions, one of 
which was constituted by the European Community.  
The logo of this construction, unlike the one proposed by the then president 
Jacques Delors of “concentric circles”, comprising countries of various levels of 
integration, could have been that of the “Olympic circles”, independent but 
connected by constraints representing “rings of solidarity” between the various 
European regions.  
                                           
14 Amato, 1993. 
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The importance of the Mediterranean dimension appeared immediately 
obvious for the strategic value of this region, for the breadth and wealth of their 
societies and markets, for the construction of the “ring of Euro-Mediterranean 
solidarity” between the whole of the European countries and the ensemble of the 
Mediterranean countries in their three major areas: the Balkans, the Middle East 
and the Maghreb.  
In that vision, the entire Arab World and Iran was comprised. There were 
two specificities that still exist today: Turkey and Israel. The former to be 
resolved with a reunion of Turkey and Greece in the European Community, and 
the latter as a problem of protecting minorities within the Arab world.15  
A study produced by the German Akademie für Raumforschung 
Landeplanum (ARL) and the French Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire 
et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR) arrived at analogous results, contrasting the 
scenario of the “European banana” with that of a European system based on the 
major European and Mediterranean meso-regions.16 
There were multiple consequences of this approach and on many of these 
there was strong convergence:  
1) The North-South relationships in the Mediterranean were to be managed 
through dialogue between the European Community on one side and the sub-
Mediterranean regions (Maghreb, the Balkans, Middle East) on the other, 
overcoming the old tradition of bilateral relationships aimed at creating 
fragmentation and division. Therefore, mutual recognition of territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty, rejection and opposition to every kind of external 
intrusion. Coherently with this objective, the European Union has repeatedly 
asserted the concept and the practice of (meso-) regional dialogue, namely 
among large regional aggregates precisely to overcome the limits of the old 
bilateral national approach.  
2) Starting up a great dialogue between Europe and the Arab World, in its 
various articulations, as the main reference framework. The political path was a 
gradual broadening to the North of the European Community up to and 
including all the European countries, and of a gradual widening of the 
relationships to the South to include the rest of the Arab countries in Euro-
Mediterranean co development, as far as Iran.  
3) The objective of co-development was pursued with growing cooperation 
between various areas, that is integrating the diversities, but in order to enhance 
and strengthen them not to cancel them out. The unity of social, cultural, 
political and military strategies objectives, often recalled also in the Barcelona 
documents, was to serve to move away from the logic of reading and intervening 
in the Mediterranean prompted by emergencies (emigration, environment, 
                                           
15 Amoroso B., Infante D., Gomez y Paloma S., Perrone N. (ed.) Marginalization, Specialization and 
Cooperation in the Baltic and Mediterranean Regions: Synthesis Report, FOP 343, FAST MONITOR, DG XII, 
EC. Brussels 1993).  
16 Treuner P. and Foucher M. Towards a New European Space, ARL/DATAR, Hannover, 1995.  
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conflicts, oil, etc.) in order to create a reference framework over the medium and 
long term.  
 
The agreement reached at the Barcelona Conference between the countries 
of the European Community and the 12 countries of the southern shores was 
presented as the first step towards a widening of the agreement to the entire 
Mediterranean region.  
These lines of thought were formally approved at Barcelona in 1995, but 
then disregarded and misrepresented in successive years. What has been 
affirmed is a different direction. The process of co-development of the European 
Union to the North with the formation of a Baltic Region with own institutions, 
has been replaced with the integration of the countries of northern Europe and of 
the Balkan area in the same European Union.  
This has introduced elements of division in this region, with Norway 
remaining outside the Union, and a position of partial adhesion by Denmark and 
Sweden, still outside the system of the Euro and severely divided within.  
The same line has been adopted by the central European countries, whose 
co-optation in the European Union is a clumsy attempt to fill the identity gap 
that has been created with the “fall of the wall” with an idea of Europe cloned on 
the image of “westernism”.  
An inconsistent attempt since it is difficult to fill a void with nothing, and 
that already proves at odds with the indications supplied by the European Union 
given the Atlantic choice made by these countries on occasion of the war against 
Iraq.  
European integration has been extended to comprise the Balkans, where it 
has favoured the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, and tendencies to 
integrate single countries of the southern shores (Israel, but also Morocco and 
Tunisia) in the European block have emerged with devastating effects for the 
internal cohesion of these areas.  
The process of regional integration of sub Mediterranean regions has been 
reverted by introducing elements of division between the countries of the Arab 
Maghreb Union (with prejudicial questions on Libya and Algeria), and the 
cooperation of the countries of the Middle East.  
Therefore, a conception has been asserted for the South that has restricted its framework 
to the countries of the “Mediterranean shores”, cancelling the North-African and Arab world 
context, and instead making the priorities and the importance of two countries emerge 
(Turkey and Israel), supported by the strategic-military interests of the United States.  
Finally, the articulation of the process of “co-development”, by definition a 
multidimensional phenomenon, has been reduced, as regards the economy, to 
the creation of the “free trade area” and therefore to economic integration in the 
strictest sense, and in the cultural-institutional dialogue following the 
formulation of the catechism on “human rights” and “democracy” ratified on 
western constitutions.  
The failure of the Barcelona process arose therefore from here: from 
affirming the strategic interests of capitalist globalization in Europe and the 
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Mediterranean, whose two greatest burdens are the liberist policies in the 
economy and the American military presence. The ten years of applying the 
policies envisaged by the Barcelona process today allow analyzing the results 
achieved in detail.  
 
 
 
The appraisal of the Barcelona process  
 
The Mediterranean countries arrived at the Barcelona encounter after a decade 
of Structural Adjustment Policies imposed on them by the institutions of 
globalization (WB and IMF).  
The results of these policies are not lacking. Most countries presented the 
renowned “budget parameters” in order; indeed some received the award of 
“best pupils” of the IMF. However, the economic achievements of these 
accounting measures were late in coming while an increasing social and political 
destabilization has arrived punctually. The unsolved problems were:  
 
(i) the high degree of dependency on the outside, manifested with the 
fluctuation of energy prices and the slowing down of the growth of western 
countries and of the same Europe to which they hoped to link up with;  
(ii) national economic systems with limited home markets and lacking strong 
endogenous dynamic. In addition to the weak link coupling these markets 
to the countries of the northern shores of the Mediterranean, there was a 
very weak south-south interchange;  
(iii) insufficient levels of investment (inferior to 3% annually) which the 
passage to a greater quota of private investments with respect to public 
investment had substantially not modified;  
(iv) unsustainable levels of youth unemployment without prospects of 
resolution in the short and medium period. 
 
 Moreover, the MPs, although placed above the poverty line of many 
African countries, were only slightly above the lower line of the intermediate 
group of countries, with the obvious exception of Israel. The gap between the 
GNP growth rates of the MPs and the Countries of the EU continued to grow in 
spite of co-development policies.  
The proposal of the Barcelona process was therefore seen as a new 
possibility to re-launch the economies and the Mediterranean communities that, 
by combining some of the sermons on liberalization and privatization of a neo-
liberist kind with structural strategies regarding the re-launch of investments and 
Euro-Mediterranean markets, could offer new pathways to restart the economies.  
The envisaged method offered the possibility for the achievement of 
positive results. First of all, the chosen “multilateral” approach, different 
therefore from the previous EU policies but also from those of the international 
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organizations, had the objective of realizing a regional entity by means of 
economic, social and political progress.  
The interventions to be adopted envisaged:  
(i) the realization of conditions of stability for the setting up of social 
and economic reforms;  
(ii) the gradual creation of efficient production systems, favoured both by a 
new industrial and economic environment as well as by the institution of a 
free trade area. The objectives were both a greater opening of the markets 
of the south, with the abandonment of rigidly protectionist norms, as well 
as the wider opening of European markets, for industrial as well as 
agricultural products over which the EU maintained rigidly protective 
measures. The structural adjustment plans were to stimulate these 
processes;  
(iii) Limit the social impact of this transformation by taking care of the “social 
costs” and the impact on people. 17  
 
The balance of the course of the first 10 years of enacting the Barcelona 
agreement has been made allowing us to see the results and draw certain 
consequences.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of GNP per capita 1980-2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Femise, 2005. WEO, April 2004. Geutat I. and F. Serranito, (2003), “Using Panel 
Unit Root Tests to Evaluate the Income Convergence Hypothesis in Middle East and North 
Africa Countries”, ERF conference, Marrakech.  
 
The situation of income of the MPs is substantially unchanged and this has 
been possible thanks only to the flows of income transferred by emigrants to 
their own families. The leap ahead that Barcelona had promised has not taken 
place. The differences of yield between the MPs, the New Member States of the 
                                           
17 Femise 2005, p. viii  
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Union (NMS) and the countries of the EU continue to grow with a notable 
acceleration since 1995, despite the Partnership (Fig. 1).  
 
 
This is happening in the framework of an envisaged request of about 40 
million new jobs during the next 15 years, to be added to the already present 
impressive employment deficit.  
The key indications that this outline produces indicate that the dimensions 
of the still existing imbalances are such that a change at a partnership level is 
needed. Without a program and an overall progression, both of the countries and 
the markets but also of the sectors and the institutions involved, it is impossible 
to generate the necessary overall dynamics.  
One of the more highly emphasized objectives, that of liberalising and 
opening up the markets, has encountered strong resistance by the EU, which has 
hindered the liberalization of agricultural products by putting into effect an: 
“arsenal of legislation that renders access to its markets more difficult”.18 
 In the Femise Report cited here, access to the markets of developed 
countries, and the countries of the EU among these, have become more difficult 
and active and creative efforts have been made in order to augment these 
barriers. The medium level of customs duties between the MPs diminished in the 
period under examination by approximately 11%, but still remains at 17%, that 
is among the highest if compared with other world areas. At the same time, the 
protective measures as a whole in the Euro-Mediterranean zone have 
increasingly become “non-tariff”.  
This entirely western vice of preaching the liberalization of products over 
which it has a competitive advantage, thanks to the abundance of capital, but 
using protectionism in those productive fields where other countries have the 
productive advantage of the abundance of labour, reveals all its logical 
inconsistency and can only be sustained through impositions and forced 
relationships.  
In the specific detail of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships, there still 
persists an asymmetric relationship between the North and South, since the trade 
of the MPs is 7% of the foreign trade of the EU, while the EU receives 50% of 
exports of the MPs. The strongest trade ties with the EU are those with the 
Maghreb countries, which have become strengthened, while the relationships 
with the Middle East are weaker and this tendency has been further reinforced. 
The balance of payments of the EU, already in advantage at the beginning of the 
period, has been strongly reinforced (net of oil imports).  
An important indicator to evaluate the quality of these tendencies is the 
trend of the productive specializations, often denounced in the past as an 
exchange relationship of “arms for oil”, “natural products with low added value 
for advanced technological products”.  
                                           
18Ibidem  p. viii  
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In this context, the good news is that the MPs are maintaining their export 
quota on the European markets, despite the growing competition from other 
areas, but their weakness with respect to the new member states of the EU 
remains for the lack of specialization, industrial cooperation, and diversification 
of products.19  
Precisely where there are easier possibilities for the increment of activities 
and levels of specialization, for instance in the service sector (tourism and 
trade), there is still no improvement nor any pronounced interest of foreign 
investments in this area.  
The area of “greatest worry” is that of direct foreign investments (DFI). 
The Femise Report notes that the 15 MPs have received, with the sole exception 
of Tunisia, favoured perhaps by specific phenomena such as the embargo 
against Libya, a slightly higher amount of FDI than that received by Poland 
alone in the observed period.  
On this crucial aspect in order to face problems of productive restructuring 
and infrastructure, taking account however of the low level of financial 
commitment of the EU aid to these countries, it is fundamental to point out the 
possible causes of the delay.  
Among these are the weakness of the internal market due to insufficient 
income policies and a too slow creation of middle classes, reflecting the low 
salaries in the fields of services and public administration; the weak anchorage 
of these economies in those European countries too engaged in disputing tariff 
problems and public contributions instead of engaging in managerial initiatives 
able to renew or to create the entire fabric of a network of north-south 
productive relationships, therefore involving more countries and producers from 
the south, along the chains of added value and the production sectors; the 
absence of “platforms of services for businesses” that constitute the landing 
points for potentially interested entrepreneurs in those areas. All this demands 
the overcoming of useless intermediation structures whose professionalization, 
from the point of view of the vocation of operators involved and their 
qualifications, is an obstacle and not an aid in reaching the objectives.  
The major problem of the South-South relationships and cooperation, 
which was among the themes at the heart of the Barcelona process, has not 
found encouraging answers. The few existing initiatives in this field, like the 
Agadir Agreements between Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt, are still being 
ratified. An exception to all this is Syria, but with trade with neighbours that 
does not exceed 10% of its total exports.  
At the same time, the countries of the south, influenced by the culture and 
ideology of the international bodies and the EU, have exchanged the problems of 
good government that is of participation and good administration of the common 
goods of their countries and citizens, for problems of governance demanded by 
European and international institutions. These, in turn, exchange the foundations 
                                           
19Ibidem, p. 9  
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of democracy with formal problems of procedural and bookkeeping 
transparency and prefer instead to deal with strong international lobbies rather 
than with the difficult and complicated mosaic of local power structures.  
If attention is focused on the social and cultural aspects, the few positive 
factors are those created on the extension of the policies instituted before 1995 
with the programs of horizontal cooperation that involved universities, 
institutions and businesses.  
The renowned Med-Campus, Med-Urbs, Med-Invest programs and so on, 
characterized both by the scarcity of resources at their disposition, as well as the 
bureaucratic, “police-like” obstacles imposed on the partners under the aegis of 
transparency, of corruption, etc. have fallen into oblivion. The programs have 
nearly always been abruptly interrupted and whose funding has been redirected 
from “civil society” to projects contracted directly with governments and big 
business.  
That emigration was to become a disruptive phenomenon in this context 
had been foreseen and arrived right on time. Horizontal programs of cooperation 
outside the official channels and Euro-Mediterranean programs, migrations and 
remittances of emigrants that very much exceed by entity and effectiveness the 
FDI and the funding of the EU, are among the factors that have developed 
alongside the Barcelona process. These have really contributed to create those 
“rings of solidarity” with respect to which the subsidiarity of official 
interventions envisaged by co-development policies has proved marginal and 
often bankrupt.  
 
 
Co-development and rings of solidarity in the Mediterranean  
 
The analytical outline that I choose in order to draw some conclusions from the 
argument developed up to this point considers “co-development” a useful 
concept to define the policies of government, of institutions and of the major 
economic and social players.  
Co-development is thus considered an objective of common growth by 
means of a political agreement that creates an articulated dynamics of 
emancipation of all the partners.  
Co-development is therefore the area of policies that must carry 
organizations and institutions ahead. This can come about by means of the study 
of the production sectors, the channels of production, distribution and 
consumption that in the entire Mediterranean territory are able to individuate 
strangulation or expropriation of income and profit by the “strong” groups.  
The first objective of co-development is the study of these circuits of 
production and incomes in order to put an end to the forms of exploitation and 
expropriation of incomes that are unjustifiable in terms of productive and social 
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commitment. An in-depth and abundant survey of cases is contained in the V1 
Report on the Mediterranean to which I must defer for brevity reasons. 20  
The second objective of co-development is the strengthening and the 
discovery of sections of production-distribution-consumption at a regional 
dimension that realize all the positive effects of synergy and cooperation for the 
benefit of the numerous units participating in the process.  
Today this is the task of research that a cooperative relationship between 
Mediterranean universities and economic and social players could contribute to 
create. Consider the effects of a production section of the olive, or the tomato, or 
of fruit and vegetables in general, that would ensure the use of climate variations 
along the South-North axis of the Mediterranean and that could, in such a way, 
break the monopoly that the countries of the north have amassed together in 
these sectors. This they have achieved through artificial production favoured by 
low energy prices offered to them by the very countries of the south at the 
expense of their own productions.  
Co-development also involves the synergic creation of research centres that 
protect local production, favouring their modernization along lines of 
environmental, social and productive sustainability and emancipating them from 
the parasitic grip imposed by research and the centres the northern countries.  
Euro-Mediterranean programs and scientific cooperation must have this 
orientation and not the search for excellence that has the sole effect of 
strengthening the dependency and the presence of the countries of the North and 
their Academies in the countries of the South.  
For this reason, it has been said and written that the Mediterranean and 
Europe do not need the “knowledge society”, proposed and imposed by the 
United States in order protect their own “comparative advantages”, but rather 
the understanding of their own societies, needs and available resources.  
 
 
Partnership and “rings of solidarity” 
 
The awakening of Mediterranean and European societies, the paths of their 
emancipation from the “dandy” of market capitalism, is a process that is carried 
out, day by day, thanks to the “molecular” commitment of people from these 
countries, to their ability to react to adversity and find solutions and ways out 
from the blind alleys in which attempts are continually made to enclose them in.  
The basis of these processes, a resistant mesh to every formalization and 
institutionalization of the relationships, to every attempt of cloning people by 
means of “citizenship” and “rights”, is supplied by the first level of the 
communities, from the first circle of the solidarity, namely family relationships 
and friendships. A circle in which affections and friendly relationships 
                                           
20Centro Federico Caffè. VI rapporto sul Mediterraneo, Economie Mediterranee. Sistemi produttivi tradizionali 
e di nuova formazione in 10 paesi della riva sud. CNEL Roma, 2002.  
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predominate, two great things that cannot be reduced to the logic of the market 
or the rationality of politics.  
The second circle is represented by the communities of belonging, not 
always formally recognised or recognizable, but which are constituted by the 
quarters, the village and by the ensemble of social relationships between 
persons. From these community structures originate the flows of emigration that 
are able to penetrate all the control meshes of states and armies, and the strong 
money flows of the workers’ “remittances”, incomparably higher than the aid 
supplied by international organizations and private foreign investments.  
These allow the survival of community in the most various places of the 
planet that would otherwise be deserted, as happened with the Italian 
agricultural policies for Southern Italy, and then resumed with equal vigour and 
malice by European Agricultural Policies (the CAP).  
Numerous economic initiatives and forms of cooperation are also being 
born from these bonds that re-establish environments of life and production in 
the places where otherwise desolation and the desert would prevail. They are 
important facts, known to anyone travelling in the Mediterranean who abandons 
the fruitless meetings of academic conferences and organized visits by the 
embassies, in order to lose oneself among the dunes populated by the local 
populations and where at times it is possible to encounter eager local and 
European non-governmental organizations.  
In a recently published essay21, among the ten proposals of Mediterranean 
co- development, what emerges most is that of the collective remittances of 
emigrants and the bonds of solidarity that these can create with non-
governmental organizations of the European countries.22  
In the Mediterranean in 2003, the remittances of the migrant workers were 
higher than the total help from the EU and loans of the European Investment 
Bank in the region over the last 10 years. Most of the flows are small personal 
sums that support families left in the country of origin and guarantee a kind of 
insurance in case the migratory plan should fail. But there are collective forms 
of investment by immigrants coming from the southern shores that are becoming 
increasingly diffused (Figure 2).  
As an example, some regions of southern Morocco - near Tarouddant - 
have benefited from investments in infrastructures (rural electrification, roads, 
water) made with the savings of immigrants in France. This has stimulated the 
creation of associations of villages and local NGOs.  
Today, after completing the infrastructure, the local NGOs have begun to 
invest the collective remittances in projects of women’s cooperatives for the 
production of argan oil and saffron. In a similar way, a group of Moroccan 
immigrants in Spain has managed with the aid of local NGOs to mobilise funds 
                                           
21
 A. Gallina,  
22 Andrea Gallina, 2005, Economie Mediterranee. Tra Globalizzazione e Integrazione Meso-regionale, Oasi 
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for the rural development and irrigation of a zone near Al Hoceima (in the north 
of Morocco) (Gallina, 2005). 
 
  Figure 2  
Gallina A. (2006) Remittances in the Euro-Mediterranean Corridors, F. Caffè Centre 
Research Reports, 2/2006, Roskilde. 
 
*Mediterranean Partners Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Turkey. The Palestinian National Authority is not included for lack of data; Israel is 
not because is considered a developed country. 
 
There is a strange rhetoric and contradiction in the programs of the 
European EU and the nation states towards the countries of the south. These 
countries are criticized for the absence of democracy due to the absence of 
participation and civil society. But when it is discovered that there is 
participation and civil society, often in conflict with the very national 
institutions with which the EU and the states nourish close relationships, it is 
refused to recognize them.  
The civil society, or part of it, is landing on our coasts and instead of 
receiving it as liberators, both ours and theirs, we are pushing back to the sea or 
to the countries of origin. A dilemma that only the European people can resolve 
in the same way as the civil society of the south: turning our backs on the 
mechanisms of control and citizenship that constitute the basis of the apartheid 
on which our “welfare” is based.  
The future of the Mediterranean, the direction that the Mediterranean 
policies should take, is that of rejoining co-development with the initiatives 
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created by the “rings of the solidarity”, namely with the most alive and active 
forms of the civil society of these countries.  
But to cap it all, there is the need for a clarification at the root that Europe 
must make with the Mediterranean. This concerns acknowledging that the 
relationship with the communities and the countries of this meso-region passes 
through a direct and privileged dialogue with the Arab world.  
Every attempt to ignore this fact, adopting privileged and direct ethnic or 
religious minorities as interlocutors (as in the case of Israel or the Lebanon) in 
order to weaken or to destabilize the Arab world, is destined to fail and to 
prolong the actual state of crisis and war.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The new European Neighbourhood Policy is a “stab in the eye” for all objectives 
and policies that we have been discussing to date. In the presented scheme, the 
area of political intervention (co development) and that of the society as a whole 
(the rings of solidarity), have fed a process of European integration on a meso-
regional basis that has often been able to innovatively join the objective of 
internal social cohesion of the single countries and of the Union with that of 
cooperation with the near countries.  
In such a way, the limits that the concentric structure imposed on the 
European Union by the choices of Delors, that envisaged successive layers of 
concentric circles with their progressive peripherization being developed around 
the strong nucleus of the Union, has been overcome with a polycentric approach.  
Examples are the growth of the Baltic Region that has managed to include 
the countries to north and East by means of an immense net of relationships, and 
also the commitment of some European countries to undertake initiatives 
towards the Mediterranean. A system of polycentric type Olympic circles that 
has prompted the same EU to open up in several directions has, as a matter of 
fact, been superimposed on the concentric circle system institutionalized by the 
EU. 
Today, with the proposal of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
supported by Prodi since 2003, the axe has come down on this polycentric 
tendency of the EU, and an insurmountable border has been imposed between 
the countries within the concentric area and all the ”others”. In Prodi’s words, in 
fact, from now on Europe will be able to share everything but the institutions 
(which means therefore excluding new inclusions) and a criterion of bilateral 
relationships guided by strategic political criteria will be pursued towards the 
countries outside the ”wall”, which, as may be understood from the context and 
the agenda of Europe, will be primarily dominated by the economic and military 
interests of the EU. 
This therefore ”cuts” the meso-regional initiatives to the north of Europe, 
forcing a separation from the countries outside of the EU, and the same thing is 
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happening in the Mediterranean. Here, where a north-south dialogue remains, 
this will be instrumental and prevent any hope for forms of strategic 
collaboration within the respective areas of belonging.  
The Neighbourhood Policy is therefore, in my opinion, the September 11 of 
the polycentric development strategies and the creation of plurinational 
communities (Mediterranean, Baltic, Central Europe, etc.). For this reason, it 
should be fought with the same tenacity, albeit with other means, by which the 
West reacted to September 11.  
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